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Notes and Comments
LAPSED LEGACIES AND DEVISES-INTESTACY
VS. PASSAGE UNDER RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN KENTUCKY
Where a legacy or devise cannot vest at the time of the testator's
death by reason of the previous death of the beneficiary the gift will
become ineffective and is said to 'lapse."1 In recent years many states
have enacted statutes designed to prevent lapse, but in spite of these
"saving" statutes lapsed legacies and devises are still common. The
reason for this is that the statutes are limited in their scope and thus
are not able to "save" all testamentary gifts. For example, the ap-
plicable Kentucky statute provides:
If a devisee or legatee dies before the testator... leaving
issue who survive the testator, such issue shall take the estate devised
or bequeathed ... '
Since the word "issue" in the statute is not synonymous with the word
heir,"8 but is restricted to lineal descendants of the devisee and not
collateral or ascending heirs, 4 many gifts to predeceased beneficiaries
are susceptible to lapse on failure of issue.
The following discussion relates to the Kentucky rule on lapsed
legacies and devises, particularly the effect which a residuary clause
in the will may have on such lapsed gifts.
The general rule is that a devise or bequest which has lapsed will
pass as intestate property, except where there is a residuary clause in
the will. When there is a residuary clause, the general rule is that
lapsed gifts pass into the residuum and do not become intestate
property unless the testator has expressed a contrary intention. This
rule, however, is not applied in those cases where the lapsed gift is
itself a part of the residue. Where a residuary gift fails, it will pass as
intestate property and not to the remaining residuary legatees,( unless
the legatees take as members of a class. For example, if the testator
provides that the residue of his estate shall pass to his children and
he has three children at the time of the execution of the will, the
death of one of the children will not prevent the other two from taking
IATx NsoN, WiLLs 727 (1937).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 394.400 (1953).
'Slone v. Mason Coal & Coke Co., 168 Ky. 697, 182 S.W. 929 (1916).
'Dillender v. Wilson, 228 Ky. 758, 16 S.W. 2d 173 (1929).
'ArxaNsoN, WmLs 727 (1937); 3 PAGE, Wuis 95 (3rd ed. 1941); 57 Ai.
JuR. 971 (1948); anno. 10 A.L.R. 1522 (1921).
'Axn soN, WmLs 734 (1937).
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all of the residue since the gift is made to the class "children." On
the other hand, if the testator provides that the residue of his estate
shall pass "one-third to my son A, one-third to my son B, and one-
third to my son C," the death of A will not cause his one-third share
to be divided between B and C since they were to take individual
shares and were not taking as a class. The reason for the rule that the
remaining residuary legatees cannot take lapsed residuary gifts, un-
less they are taking as members of a class, is that since the lapsed gift
is itself in the residue it can not be said to pass into the residue for
it is already there.7
The justification for the general rule that lapsed gifts shall pass into
the residuum, provided the will contains a residuary clause, is the
presumption that the testator did not intend to die intestate as to any
of his property. The mere presence of a residuary clause indicates
that it was not the testator's intention that he should die intestate as to
any of his property. Kentucky once followed this general rule.8 Now,
however, by reason of statutory enactment, Kentucky's rule has become
unique in that such lapsed gifts pass as intestate property unless the
testator expresses an intention that it should pass into the residuum. 9
The Kentucky statute provides:
Unless a contrary intention appears from the will, real or
personal estate, comprised in a devise incapable of taking effect, shall
not be included in the residuary .devise contained in the will, but
shall pass as in case of intestacy.10
Since the rule in Kentucky is that lapsed gifts will not fall into the
residuum unless the testator so intends, the problem is how may such
an intention be manifested?" Once it has been determined that a
' 3PAGE, WILS 98 (3rd ed. 1941).8 Cunningham's Devisees v. Cunningham's Heirs, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 19(1856).
'Castleman v. Eastin's Ex'rs, 176 Ky. 762, 197 S.W. 445 (1917).
" Ky. REv. STAT. 394.500 (1953). This statutory declaration amounts to
more than a mere principle of construction; it provides as a rule of law that a
lapsed gift will pass as in case of intestacy unless a contrary intention appears
from the will; thus, it alters the usual effect of a residuary clause. Cunningham's
Devisees v. Cunningham's Heirs, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 19 (1856).
' In some cases the residuary legatees may get the property, not because the
testator expressed an intention that they should take lapsed gifts, but because the
gift does not actually lapse and hence the statute does not apply. For example,
in Sigmon v. Moore's Adm'r, 297 Ky. 525, 180 S.W. 2d 420 (1944), the testator
bequeathed $2,000 to his wife "for her use and benefit during her natural life
with power to dispose of the same by will at the death as she may desire", but
the wife did not so dispose of the property and the court held that the legatees
under a general residuary clause should take the $2,000. The heirs argued that
since the wife did not dispose of the $2,000 it was a lapsed bequest and should
pass as in case of intestacy under the statute. The court answered this contention
by stating that since the wife enjoyed her life estate and could have disposed of
the remainder by will if she so desired, the gift did take effect and therefore was
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legacy or devise has lapsed the Kentucky Court has been reluctant to
find sufficient manifestation of intention by the testator that the prop-
erty should fall into the residuum. May v. Walter's E.'rs'2 is the only
Kentucky case found which holds that the testator had expressed a
sufficient intention to cause the property to fall into the residuum. In
that case the testator devised his house and furniture, except a piano
and some pictures, to his sister, H. He gave the piano and the pictures
to his other sister, M, but provided that they should not be removed
from the house. The vill further provided that should H not prefer
to live in the house, then M could live in it without paying rent. H
died childless in the lifetime of the testator. The court pointed out
that under the provisions of the statute the house would descend to
the heirs at law unless the language in the will manifests an intention
that it should go to M and her children under the residuary clause.
The court granted the house to M reasoning that if the piano and
pictures devised to M were to remain in a house in which she had no
interest, present or contingent, the devise of them to her would be a
mere mockery. The court also pointed out that the fact that M could
use the house without paying rent, provided that H did not choose to
live in it, showed that the house was not intended to be given abso-
lutely to H but that she was only granted the use of it.
The other Kentucky cases have not been as liberal as May v. Walter's
Ex'rs. In Schroeder v. Bohlsen13 the testatrix' will provided that if her
brother in a lunatic asylum should be restored to his right mind, and
discharged as cured, he should have $2,000. The brother died in the
lifetime of the testatrix without being restored to reason. It was con-
tended that it was a condition precedent to the vesting of the bequest
to her brother that he should be restored to his right mind, and as his
death in the lifetime of the testatrix rendered it impossible for these
conditions to be realized, the bequest to him failed and remained a
part of the estate which passed under the residuary clause of the will.
The court rejected this contention and held that it was a lapsed legacy
and passed as intestate property under the statute. In Cundiff v. Sch-
mitt'4 the testatrix devised two lots to her sister and gave all the
residue of her estate, which "I may own or have the right to dispose
of at the time of my decease" to her husband. The sister predeceased
the testatrix. The court held that the two lots did not fall into the
not a lapsed bequest. It is also clear that where only a life estate is devised and
no disposition is made of the remainder the remainder will remain in the estate
and pass to the residuary legatees. Lester's Adm'r v. Jones, 300 Ky. 534, 189 S.W.
2d 728 (1945).
"30 Ky. Law Rep. 59, 97 S.W. 423 (1906).
"119 Ky. 805, 83 S.W. 627 (1904).
"243 S.W. 2d 667 (Ky. 1951).
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residuary clause for the benefit of the testatrix' husband. Here the
court might very easily have held that the lots should fall into the
residuum since it was expressly stated that the husband should take
all the residue of her estate which she might own or have the right to
dispose of. There was no doubt as to the testatrix' right to dispose of
the two lots. However, the court did not deem this fact to be a suf-
ficient manifestation of intention under the statute to cause the lapsed
devise to go to the residuary legatee. Probably the strongest mani-
festation of intention that a lapsed gift should pass to the residuary
legatee appeared in the will involved in Northcutt's Ex'r v. Farmers
Nat. Bank.15 In that case the will provided for a bequest of $2,000 to
a named person "if living, otherwise void." The court held that this
provision did not indicate an intention that that amount should go to
the residuary legatees in case of the death of the named legatee before
that of the testator. It would seem that it would be sounder reasoning
to say that since the named legatee was not living and his bequest
void, the will should be read without the mention of the void pro-
vision. To arrive at the testator's true intention under such a provision
the only just thing to do would be to strike out the bequest which was
expressly made void by the terms of the instrument and read the will
just as though no such provision was ever present. The necessary
effect of striking out such void bequests would be to cause the prop-
erty to go into the residuum if the will contains a residuary clause.
It could have been argued further that the statute had no application
in the above case since the bequest was expressly made void and the
statute was only intended to apply to lapsed gifts. This contention,
however, could be answered by pointing to the broad language of the
statute applicable to all devises and bequests "incapable of taking
effect," since void bequests would be those incapable of taking effect. 16
The attitude of the Kentucky court, gathered from the foregoing
cases, indicates a strict application of the statute. The residuary
legatee is most apt to lose his case unless a clear intention that he
should take lapsed bequests and devises appears in the will. The
statute has defined the policy by which the court is to be guided. The
statute may be said to form a double purpose. First, it probably more
truly defines the testator's intention in those cases where he disposes
' 292 Ky. 628, 166 S.W. 2d 971 (1942).
"The language of the will is construed in favor of the heirs at law. Of
course, only those wills in which the intention is difficult to determine reach theCourt of Appeals for interpretation. None of the above cases can be said to
express a clear intention that residuary legatees should take lapsed gifts, rather,
the intention must be inferred. If a testator wishes that lapsed gifts should pass
into the residuum it is a simple matter for him to express his intention clearly by
a statement to that effect.
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of a substantial part of his estate to his wife or other member of his
family and then leaves the residue to some stranger or charitable
organization. If the wife or member of the family predeceases him and
no change is made in the will, it would be hard to assume in the
majority of cases that his intention was that the lapsed gifts should
go to the residuary legatee to the detriment of his heirs at law. Second,
it is just as reasonable to suppose that the testator would have in-
tended for all of his heirs to share in such property rather than to
allow only one or two to receive a windfall.
The Kentucky statute requiring lapsed legacies and devises to go
to the heirs at law, thus contradicting the presumption against in-
testacy, seems to this writer to state a reasonable policy. The truth
in this type case is that the testator lacked sufficient foresight to an-
ticipate such an event, otherwise he surely would have made pro-
vision for it. Where no provision is made or intention is clearly ex-
pressed, it is reasonable for the legislature in furtherance of the public
interest to provide for the distribution of such property and for the
court to give full effect to that provision.
PAuL E. DEcaum
ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE
TO EXPLAIN AMBIGUITIES IN WILLS
A valid will may exist, yet, when the will is probated, it may be
discovered that because of the surrounding facts or circumstances, or
because of the wording upon the face of the will itself, the disposition
of the testator's property is uncertain. The purpose of this note is to
attempt a clarification of the rules governing the admissibility of evi-
dence to explain ambiguous terms in wills. Problems of admissibility
where fraud, mistake or undue influence is alleged will not be con-
sidered.
Where it is sought to employ parol evidence to explain a word or
term in a will, major policy considerations come into conflict. On the
one hand is the policy of giving effect to the testators intentions; on
the other, the policy against writing the will for the testator or giving
effect to an oral will. Where a devise or bequest is such that two
meanings may equally apply, it is reasonable to suppose that the
testator intended one of the two rather than neither; therefore, the
court should admit extrinsic evidence to determine and give effect to
the testator's intention. This, however, comes into conflict with the
